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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. et al.

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (translation)

Depository: OIKAWA, Kishiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose, as follows.

1. I was born in Nagato Prefecture on 8 February 1883. I entered the Naval Academy in 1900 and until September 1945 when I was placed on the reserve list I have served in the Navy for 45 years. On 5 September 1940, I took office as Navy Minister in the Second Kono Cabinet, succeeding the former Navy Minister, admiral Togo Yoshida. Following that, from 18 July 1941 to 16 October 1941 I was Navy Minister in the Third Kono Cabinet until it resigned en bloc.
2. Concerning the Tripartite Alliance, there were various arguments in Government circles when the German-Japanese Alliance Pact was concluded, but what impressed me most strongly was the fact that it sought to prevent the U.S. from entering the European War thereby stopping the devastations of warfare from spreading throughout the world, and also

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the settlement of the China Incident as well as the establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. But what I feared the most was the incurring of hostilities with those nations even if a slight friction with Anglo-American powers or Soviet Union could not be averted. That is to say that the Navy sought to avert war with U.S. and Britain at all cost and earnestly hoped for U.S. Japanese relations to return to normal conditions and the China Incident to reach an early (peaceful) solution. However, on one hand, situations prevailing at that time forced our country to take an isolated stand internationally while on the other hand it was thought extremely difficult to approach the U.S. and Britain. We had already acknowledged the new policy itself, backed up by the combined strength of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union, but we feared the incurring of war with the U.S. and Britain if we concluded a Tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy, and therefore we felt that a most careful deliberation on the proposal was necessary. Especially, as to automatically sharing the obligation of entering war we strongly expressed absolute opposition. However, later on, according to the explanation made by Foreign Minister Matsuoka I understood the situation as follows: "Not only does Germany not desire Japan's entry into the European War at the present stage but desires even more than Japan does to prevent America's entry into the war. On this point we were able to recognize sufficient earnestness to cooperate with us and that even after the

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conclusion of the Alliance Pact the decision to enter the war would be made by Japan's free will. As for Japanese-Soviet relations all possible efforts were to be made to promote friendly understanding. Such definite understanding were reached." Therefore the Navy lost all grounds for opposing the proposal. Not only that but I thought that the Navy's stubborn adherence to its own standpunkt would create an violent internal rivalry if it continued in opposition to the public opinion which at that time was gradually favoring the Axis. Therefore I stated at the Cabinet meeting that, "The Navy does not have any other proposal which will tide over the current (critical) situation." The autonomous decision when entering war and adjustment of U.S. Japanese relations were the two major factors to which the Navy attached greatest importance, and as to the first factor, we specially clearly indicated it in an official diplomatic paper, and as Senior Delegate of the Military Committee for the Mixed Technical Commission in the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact signing, Vice Admiral Nakuni Nemura, who was senior to the Army Delegate, Rear Admiral Katsur Abe was chosen who understood the progress of the Alliance negotiations up to that time as Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, Naval Ministry. Both delegates were appointed on 15 October. Again, in March 1941 when Foreign Minister Matsukata was embarking on a trip to Europe I entered a strong advice

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to the Foreign Minister not to make understandings which may involve us in a war other than with China, and especially with the U.S. and Britain. Moreover I added Commander Shigeru Fujii among his attendants to be careful on the advice I made to the Foreign Minister. Again as to adjustment of Japanese-U.S. relations I exerted special effort. Hitherto, Foreign Minister Matsukata had been negotiating with Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura to accept the post of Ambassador to the U.S. but the Admiral refused to accept it. But for the adjustment of U.S.-Japanese relations I was convinced that no one was more suitable for the post as the Admiral who understood the U.S. well and was also an intimate friend of President Roosevelt and so in early October, I also sent the Vice-Minister for the Navy, Vice Admiral Toyoda to persuade him to accept it and finally succeeded in doing so. I also requested, both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to commence early adjustment of U.S. Japanese relations at various opportunities.

3. The definite plan which passed the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 is exactly as stated in Evidence No. 588. Prior to it, after the German-Soviet War began, studies were made Ministry, Army Ministry and Foreign Ministry etc, starting around the 22nd or 23rd of June, with a view to determine our attitude in dealing with international situations. The original plan was approved by the Liaison Conference around June and I do not remember the exact date but it was informally represented

(reported) to the Emperor by the Prime Minister, Chief of Army General Staff and Chief of Naval General Staff.

On 2 July of the same year, an Imperial Conference was held.

Those present were, Prime Minister Kono, Chairman of the Privy Council Hara, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama, Vice-Chief of General Staff Tsukada, Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff Kondo, Home Minister Hirahara, Finance Minister Kawada, President of the Planning Board Suzuki, War Minister Tojo, Foreign Minister Matsukata and Naval Minister, myself. The order of the conference began with Prime Minister Kono reading the general outline (contents) of the plan. Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama and Chief of Naval General Staff Nagao explained the important points, after which the Chairman of the Privy Council asked a question to the following effect.

"What are the prospects of provoking a war with the U.S. and Britain?" To which Chief-of-Army General Staff Sugiyama replied as follows. "We shall carry out the dispatching of troops to Southern French Indo-China under sufficient understanding with the French Indo-China authorities and every effort shall be made to avert any incitement with the U.S. and Britain. However, if by chance we are challenged we must be prepared to meet it. By the term, "willing to fight the U.S. and Britain," is meant preparedness for war and not resolution to begin war."

4. The decision passed by the Imperial Conference of 6 September, I remember to be the same, in general, as stated in Evidence 588 tendered by the Prosecution. The Imperial Conference was held on 6 September at the Imperial Palace, the same as before. Explanations on the plan were made by the Prime Minister, Chief of Army General Staff and Chief of Naval General Staff. Following which I think there was also an explanation by the Foreign Minister. It was then when Chairman of the Privy Council Hara asked a question to the Government and Supreme Command to the effect that, "according to the way this plan is written, it mentions the preparations for war before the policy of striving through diplomatic channels, but what is the relation between the two?" Towards this query I answered, "The main objective of this plan is to accomplish our demands through diplomatic measures." Whereas the Emperor pressed the Supreme Command to make an explanation, Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano replied, "The Supreme Command is of the same opinion as the Government." At this conference the Emperor quoted Emperor Meiji's poem which impressed us deeply. The Imperial poem ran like this, "In this world where we dwell the seven sons as brother, why rage there the warring waves."

5.. In early August 1941 when we were told from Prince Konoe about intentions of a direct conference with President Roosevelt we attached great expectations to it. The Navy

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requisitioned the merchantship Nitta Maru for that purpose and completed all preparations.. I had in my mind Admiral Yamamoto and Vice Admiral Keijun Oka as Naval attendant and place Admiral Mineichi Koga as the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. I had also gained the informal consent of Admiral Yamamoto.

6. Even after October came, U.S. Japanese negotiations made no progress which we had expected and according to the "Outlines On Accomplishment of the Empire's National Policy," which was approved at the Imperial Conference of 6 September we had to decide our attitude in view of U.S. Japanese negotiations. Needless to say the Navy did all it could to avoid war with the U.S.. And this sentiment (Opinions) among the naval circles was communicated to Premier Kono. In amidst such circumstances, the reasons for entrusting its decision to the Prime Minister was because we considered the followings:

- a) It is a well known fact that hitherto the internal strong-minded elements had been criticizing the Navy's attitude as being effeminate. Therefore, if the Navy made a public announcement that it "lacked confidence in fighting the U.S.", it would lead to (create) the disruption of national opinions, cause the pitting of Army against the Navy and consequently develop into a grave internal problem.

- b) As a result of the above controversy the Chugking Regime which was dependant upon the U.S. and British support, would take advantage and aggravate their spirit of resistance and the settlement of the China Incident would become hopeless. Moreover, conditions for U.S. Japanese negotiations would be all the more disadvantageous, and together with it our internal public opinion will further grow serious and there was fear of all hopes for an amicable settlement being lost.
- c) As the Prime Minister too was of exactly the same opinion as the Navy, and this problem, moreover, had an important bearing on the overall national strength and hence should not be dogmatically concluded solely on the basis of the Navy's standpoint, I also took into consideration the circumstances set forth in the preceding paragraph and proposed to leave the decision on this matter to the Prime Minister.

On this 23rd day of May, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: OIKAWA, Kashiro (seal)

I, TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Same Place

Witness: (signed) TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

OIKAWA, Kashiro (son)

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 東京都世田谷區上野毛町一一三二

及川 古志郎

明治十六年二月八日生

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ

如ク供述致シマス

一、私ハ明治十六年二月八日新潟縣ニ生レ明治三十三年海軍兵學校入校以來昭和二十年九月豫備役ニナル迄約四十五年間海軍ニ勤務シタ。昭和十五年九月五日第二次近衛内閣ニ於ケル前海相吉田喜吾海軍大將ノ後ヲ承ケテ海相ノ任ニツイタ、引續キ昭和十六年七月十八日ヨリ第三次近衛内閣ニ於ケル海相ノ職ニ就キ昭和十六年十月十六日同内閣總辭職迄海相ノ地位ニアツタ。

二、三國同盟ニ就テハ日獨同盟締結ノ際政府部内ニ於テモ種々ノ議論ガアツクガ余トシテ特ニ印象深ク考ヘタノハ同盟ニ依リ米ノ歐洲戦争參入ヲ防止シ依テ以テ戰禍ノ世界ニ擴大スルヲ阻止スルコト並ニ支那事變ノ解決及對蘇親善關係ノ確立ノ諸點デアリ又最モ心配シタノハ之ニ依リ英米又ハ蘇トノ間ニ多少ノ摩擦ハ已ムヲ得ナイトシテ之等ノ國ト戰爭ガ生起スル様ナコトニナラヌ様ニトノ點デアツタ。即チ當時海軍トシテハ飽ク迄モ對英米戰ヲ避ケ日米國交ヲ平常化スル事ト支那事變ノ速カナル解決トヲ熱望シテキタ。併シ一方ニ於テ當時我國ハ國際的ニ孤立セントスル情勢下ニアリ他方ニ於テハ英米

トノ接近ハ至難ト言フ事情ヨリ考ヘテ獨伊蘇ノ結合勢力ヲ背景トスル新政策夫レ自身ハ一應諒承セル處デアルガ、サレバトテ獨伊トノ三國同盟締結ト云フコトハ或ハ特英米戰誘發ノ虞モアルガ故ニ之ヲ實行ニ移スニハ最モ慎重ナル考慮ヲ要スル案件ト思考シタ。特ニ自動的參戰ノ義務ヲ負フコトニ對シテハ絕對反對ノ態度ヲ堅持シタノデアル。然ルニ其ノ後ニナツテ松岡外相ノ説明ニ依リ「獨逸ハ現段階ニ於テ帝國ノ歐洲戰參加ヲ要望シナバカリデナク米國ノ參戰防衛ニ就テハ俄國ト同様以上熱意ヲ有シ之ノ點我ト協力セントスル充分ナル要望ヲ認メ得タルコト及同盟締結後ト雖モ參戰ノ決定ハ日本ガ自主的ニ行フコト又日蘇隸係ニ就テハ極力友好的了解増進ニ努メルコト等ノ確實ヲ諒解ニ到達シタ」ト承知シタ。ソコテ最早海軍トシテハ從來反對セル理由ヲ失ツタノミナラズ當時澎湃タリシ樞軸支持ノ輿論ニ抗シテ海軍獨自ノ立場ヲ固執スルコトハ却ツテ戦烈ナル國內對立ヲ惹起スルモノト考ヘ余ハ閣議ニ於テ「現下ノ局面ヲ打開スル爲ニハ海軍トシテハ他ニ名案ヲ持タズ」ト申述ベタ次第デアル。

參戰問題ノ自主的決定及日米國交調整ノニツハ海軍トシテ最モ重大
 視セル要點アルノデ前者ニ就テハ之ヲ特ニ外交文書ニ明カニスル
 ト共ニ歐洲ニ派遣スペキ日獨伊三國條約混合専門委員會軍事委員首
 席ニハ特ニ陸軍ヨリモ先任ナル野村直邦海軍中將ヲ又海軍次席委員
 ニハ海軍省軍務局長トシテ其レ迄ノ同盟交渉經過ヲ承知シアリシ阿
 部勝雄海軍少將ヲ十月十五日任命シ萬全ヲ期シタノアル。尙昭和
 十六年三月松岡外相渡歐ノ際ニハ余ハ日本ガ支那以外ノ諸國特ニ米
 英トノ戰爭ニ捲込マル様ナ話合ヲシナイ様ニ外相ニ嚴重ニ申入ラ
 爲シ更ニ藤井茂海軍中佐ヲ其ノ隨員ニ加ハラシメ特ニ上記申入レノ
 點ニ關シ注意セシメタノアル。

又日米國交調整ニ關シテモ余ハ特別ノ努力ヲ拂ツタ。從來松岡外相
 ノ駐米大使トシテ野村吉三郎海軍大將ニ就任ヲ交渉シテ居ツタガ同
 大將ハ之ヲ固辭シテ受諾サレナカツタ。然シ日米國交調整ノ爲ニハ
 米國ヲ深ク理解シ且「ルーズベルト」大統領トモ親交厚キ同大將以
 外ニ適任者無シトノ信念ノ下ニ十月上旬余モ亦海軍次官豊田海軍中

將ヲシテ極力就任ヲ懇意セシメ遂ニ受諾ヲ取付クルニ至ツタノテアルガ更ニ種々ノ機會ニ速カニ日米國交調整ニ着手スル様首相外相ニ要請シタ。

三、昭和十六年七月二日ノ御前會議ノ決定案ハ證第五八八號ノ通りデアル。是ヨリ先獨蘇戰ガ始マツテカラ此ノ世界ノ情勢ニ對應シテ、我國ノ態度ヲ定メル爲六月二十二、三日頃カラ參謀本部、軍令部、陸軍省、海軍省、外務省等ノ間ニ檢討ガ行ハレタ。此ノ原案ハ大体六月二十八日ノ連絡會議テ決定サレタモノニアリ、ソシテ日ハ確實ニ覺エナイガ總理大臣、參謀總長、軍令部總長ヨリ陛下ニ内奏セラレタ。同年七月二日宮中ニ於テ御前會議ガ開カレタ。出席者ハ近衛首相、原樞密院議長、杉山參謀次長、塙田參謀次長、永野軍令部總長、近藤軍令部次長、平沼内相、河田藏相、鈴木企畫院總裁、東條陸相、松岡外相及海軍大臣ノ私デアツタ。會議ノ順序ハ先ツ近衛首相ヨリ此ノ案ノ全体ノ意味ヲ朗讀シ杉山參謀總長、永野軍令部總長カラ要項ノ説明ガアツタ後、原樞密院議長カラ「對米英戰惹起ノ見透如何」

ト言フ風ナ質問ガアリ、之ニ對シ杉山總長ヨリ次ノ主旨ノ説明ガアツタ。

「我方ハ佛印側ノ充分ナ了解ノ下ニ南部佛印派兵ヲ平和裡ニ之ヲ行ヒ英米ヲ刺戟スル様ナ事ハ極力避ケル併シ萬一英米側カラ之ガ爲戰ヒヲ挑ムガ如キ事アラバ其ノ場合ニハ敢然之ヲ受ケテ立ツ事ヲ覺悟セネバナラヌ」「對米英戰ヲ辭セズ」トハ其ノ覺悟ヲ表明シタモノデアツテ戰爭ノ決意ヲ表明シタモノデハナイ』

四九月六日ノ御前會議ノ決定ハ大体ニ於テハ檢事カラ提出サレタト言フ五八八號中ノモノト同様テアルト記憶スル。御前會議ハ九月六日前回ト同ジク宮中ニ於テ開カレタ。案ノ説明ハ首相及參謀總長、軍令部總長カラ言上シタ。之ニ續イア外務大臣ヨリモ説明ガアツタト思フ。此ノ時原樞密院議長ヨリ政府及統帥部ニ對シテ此ノ案ノ書キ方テハ外交ニ努力スルト言フ方針ヨリ前ニ戰爭準備ト言フコトガ記シテアルガ兩者ノ關係如何ト言フ意味ノ質問ガアツタ。之ニ對シヨリ「此ノ案ハ外交ノ手段ヲ通シテ要求ヲ貫徹スルコトガ主デアル」

旨答辯シ陛下ヨリ統帥部ノ意見ノ開陳ヲ催促サレタノテ永野軍令部
總長ハ「統帥部モ政府ト同意見テアリマス」ト奉答申上ゲタ。此ノ
會議ニ於テ陛下ハ明治天皇ノ御製ヲ朗讀セラレ一同非常ナル感激ニ
打タレタノデアル。

御璽ハ「よもの海みなはらからと思ふ世になど波風のたちさわぐら
む」ト言フノデアル。

五 昭和十六年八月初頭近衛公ヨリ「ルーズベルト」大統領ト直接會談
ノ意圖ヲ打明ケラレタ時余等ハ之ニ對シテ非常ナ期待ヲ托シタノテ
アツタ。海軍ハ其ノ爲ニ商船新田丸ヲ徵用シテ萬端ノ準備ヲ整ヘ余
ハ海軍側隨員トシテ山本五十六大將、岡敬純少將等ヲ派遣シ聯合艦
隊司令長官ノ後任ニハ古賀峯一海軍大將ヲ据ヘル腹案テアツタ。ソ
シテ山本大將ノ内諾モ得タノデアツタ。

六 十月ニ入ツテモ日米交渉ハ豫期ノ進展ヲ爲サズ、九月六日ノ御前會
議デ決定サレタ「帝國國策遂行要領」ニ從ツテ日米交渉ニ關スル態
度ヲ決定セネバナラヌコトトナツタ。勿論海軍トシテハ日米戰爭ヲ

極力忌避シタ。ソシテ此ノ海軍部内ノ意向ハ近衛首相ニモ通達シタ
右ノ場合ニ於テ其ノ決定ヲ首相ニ一任シタノハ主トシテ次ノ理由ヲ
考慮シタモノアル。

(イ) 國内强硬論者ガ兔角從來ノ海軍ノ態度ヲ軟弱デアルト非難シテ居
タノハ衆知ノ事實デアル。ソレデ若シ海軍ガ「對米戰自信ナシ」
ナル公式表明ヲ行ヘバ當時ノ國內情勢ニ鑑ミ國論ノ分裂、陸海軍
ノ對立ヲ起シ由々數キ國內問題ニ發展スル虞ガアツタ。

(ロ) 右ノ結果米英依存ノ重慶政權ニヨリ足許ヲ見透サレ益々其ノ抗戰
意識ヲ助長シテ支那事變解決ハ絶望的トナル。且日米交渉ノ條件
益々不利トナリ之ガ爲我國内輿論モ益々悪化シ交渉妥結ノ希望ハ
絶無トナル虞ガアツタ。

(ハ) 首相モ海軍ト全ク意見ガ同ジデアツタノト此ノ問題ハ全体ノ國力
ニモ重大ナ關係ガアリ海軍ノミノ立場ヲ以テ斷定スペキテナイカ
ラ前項事情ヲモ考慮シ近衛首相ニ對シ本件決定ヲ一任スル旨申出
タノアル。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）五月二十三日於東京

供述者及川古志郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シ

マス

同日於同所

立會人高橋義次

宣
誓
書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述べ何事ヲモ默祕セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザ

ルコトヲ誓フ

(署名)
捺印一及
川 古志郎

ERIKSEN SHELL

Delete on page 5, lines four to line ten, the following sentence.

"These present were, Prime Minister Konoe, Chairman of the Privy Council Hara, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama, Vice-Chief of General Staff Tsukada, Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Vice Chief of Naval General Staff Kondo, Home Minister Hiranuma, Finance Minister Kawada, President of the Planning Board Suzuki, War Minister Tojo, Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Naval Minister myself.

正誤表